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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff filed this civil action seeking to invalidate the 
administrative forfeiture of $93,163 in United States 
currency, which he now asserts was his pr operty. The crux 
of his complaint is that the Drug Enforcement 
Administration did not properly notify him of the impending 
forfeiture. The DEA made a single attempt at notification by 
mailing a letter to the plaintiff 's for mer address. This letter 
was returned with the notation "Attempted Not Known." 
Given the circumstances described in this r ecord, minimal, 
reasonable effort would have enabled the government to 
locate plaintiff and send a letter to a curr ent residence. In 
the absence of sufficient notice, we conclude that it was 
error to enter summary judgment for the gover nment, and 
we will reverse. 
 
On February 22, 1993, the pickup truck driven by 
plaintiff Don Ameche Foehl, Sr. was pulled over for 
speeding by Beaumont Township police in Jef ferson 
County, Texas. The officers searched the truck and 
discovered $93,163 in cash in the spare tire. A small 
quantity of marijuana was found in an additional tir e laying 
in the bed of the truck. Although Foehl allegedly denied 
ownership of the currency at the scene, he r efused to sign 
a document to that effect. 
 
Foehl produced a vehicle registration car d verifying that 
the pickup truck was owned by his wife, Bonnie Foehl, of 
8817 Lott Road, Eight Mile, Alabama. The parties dispute, 
however, whether Foehl provided police with a current 
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address for himself at the time of the arr est. He admits 
producing an Alabama driver's license showing a prior 
address of 103 So. Thompson Court, Chickasaw, Alabama. 
Foehl alleges, however, that he told the officers that his 
residence had changed to 8817 Lott Road,1 Eight Mile, 
Alabama, and that he had not yet obtained a license 
reflecting the change of address. He also contends that he 
again gave the police the Lott Road address while being 
fingerprinted at the Beaumont Township Police Station. 
 
The arresting officer's report, in contrast, lists only the 
Thompson Court residence. In his declarationfiled in the 
District Court, the officer said that Foehl never provided an 
address other than the one at Thompson Court, but he 
admitted that documents found in the vehicle indicated 
that Don Ameche Foehl, Jr. and Bonnie Foehl r esided at 
Lott Road. 
 
Plaintiff posted $100 cash bail and the Beaumont police 
released him on the day of his arrest. He asserts that at the 
time of his release the police gave him the following: a copy 
of the arrest report, a notice to appear in court, receipt for 
the bail money, a receipt for the truck's impoundment, and 
a receipt for the approximately $93,000 in currency. All of 
these documents, he alleges, referred to the Lott Road 
address. 
 
On March 12, 1993, the District Clerk for Jef ferson 
County, Texas, issued Notices of Forfeiture for the pickup 
truck to Foehl and his wife at 8817 Lott Road. Sent by 
certified mail, the notices were deliver ed to that address on 
March 15th. The return-receipt cards were signed by a 
"Carol Barnhill" and retur ned. The record contains no 
information about the identity of this person or what her 
relationship to the plaintiff might have been. 
 
Bonnie Foehl's attorney filed a claim for the truck on her 
behalf on April 5, 1993. Because Foehl had not joined in 
his wife's claim, he was served notice in person at the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At various points in the record, the address is listed as 8817 or 8825 
Lott Road. A DEA agent explained that number 8817 appears to be 
plaintiff 's auto repair garage, while his home is located on the 
adjoining 
plot, number 8825. We will treat the Lott Road addresses as one. 
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Jefferson County courthouse on June 23, 1993, when he 
appeared in connection with the chargesfiled by the 
Beaumont police. The proceeding involving the truck was 
settled some weeks later. 
 
Meanwhile, on March 5th, 1993, the Beaumont police 
had contacted the DEA, which ultimately "adopted" the 
seized cash2 and accepted the case for administrative 
forfeiture. A letter from the DEA advising plaintiff of the 
proposed forfeiture was sent by certified mail on March 29, 
1993 to the Thompson Court address. The letter was 
returned with the notation "RETURNED TO SENDER -- 
ATTEMPTED NOT KNOWN." It is not clear on what date the 
letter was returned. On April 7, April 14, and April 21, 
1993, the DEA published Notice of Seizure in the USA 
Today newspaper. 
 
On April 19, 1993, DEA headquarters, whose location is 
not revealed in the record, asked its Houston division for 
alternative addresses for plaintif f. That office responded 
that "[c]ase files and case agent have no other addresses 
available." So far as the record r eveals, the DEA made no 
other efforts to determine the plaintif f 's whereabouts, nor 
did it further attempt to notify him of the pr oceedings. The 
currency was forfeited on June 18, 1993. 
 
Months before his arrest in Texas, plaintiff had been the 
subject of a separate and unrelated DEA investigation. Law 
enforcement officers had spent several weeks observing 
events at the Lott Road location. Convinced that plaintiff 
was involved in drug trafficking, the DEA obtained an 
indictment in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Alabama on May 20, 1993, charging 
him with violating narcotics laws. He was arr ested six days 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Seizures performed by state or local law enforcement officials are 
"adopted" by the DEA when it takes custody of the seized property and 
treats it as if the agency had made the initial seizure. The DEA then 
institutes forfeiture proceedings in accordance with federal law. The 
Attorney General is authorized to shar e the forfeited property with local 
law enforcement organizations, assuring that the proportion given "bears 
a reasonable relationship to the degr ee of direct participation of the 
State 
or local agency in the law enforcement effort resulting in the forfeiture 
. . . ." 21 U.S.C. S 881(e)(3)(A). 
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later and released on his own recognizance, with "Lott 
Road" listed as his address. After entering a plea bargain, 
he began a 60-month sentence on February 8, 1994. 
 
In a declaration filed in the case before us, Foehl asserted 
that he and his wife tried continuously to r eclaim the 
money but were thwarted in every attempt. He sent several 
letters to the Beaumont police, but the only r esponse he 
received allegedly stated that he could not pursue his claim 
until he had completed his federal sentence. 
 
Foehl contends that it was not until 1998, thr ough the 
efforts of his current counsel, that he learned that the DEA 
had forfeited the currency shortly after receiving it from the 
Beaumont police. Listing his address as Union County, New 
Jersey, he filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey in June 1998, seeking 
to overturn the forfeiture. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the government, relying on several gr ounds. It concluded 
that Foehl had given the Beaumont police the Thompson 
Court address, and that he had presented no evidence that 
the DEA was, or should have been, aware that the 
information was incorrect. Foehl had not been in custody 
when the letter was sent; therefore, the Court reasoned that 
notice by certified mail to the Thompson Court location was 
constitutionally sufficient. 
 
The District Court also held that the claim was barr ed by 
the doctrine of laches because the five-year delay in 
bringing the claim was both unreasonable and pr ejudicial 
to the government. In addition, the Court pointed out that 
Foehl's complaint cited the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. S 1346(b), as a basis for jurisdiction, but that the 
two-year statute of limitations had expired on that cause of 
action. 
 
The parties agree that the Tort Claims Act does not apply 
here. Foehl contends that the one refer ence to the Act in 
his complaint was inadvertent, and that his claim is 
predicated on the Administrative Procedur e Act, 5 U.S.C. 
S 701 et seq., which was cited at the beginning of his 
complaint and to which Counts One through Five referred. 
Foehl argues that the District Court should have granted 
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him leave to clarify his complaint to reflect a claim under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, or , alternatively, assumed 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, as the district 




This Court exercises de novo review over a district court's 
grant of summary judgment. See Goosby v. Johnson & 
Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Goosby , 228 F.3d at 318. We 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom summary judgment was entered. Medical 
Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F .3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
We address first the District Court's holding that the 
claim was barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act's statute 
of limitations. We would agree with that conclusion if that 
Act were the basis for Foehl's suit. Wefind, however, that 
this case was brought pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.3 
 
It is understandable that the District Court assumed that 
the Tort Claims Act was the basis for the plaintiff 's case, 
given that plaintiff cited that statute specifically. On the 
other hand, in the heading of the complaint and in all five 
counts, plaintiff cited the Administrative Pr ocedure Act. The 
civil action cover sheet also referred to the APA "to 
challenge and seek recovery of approximately $94,000 in 
currency confiscated from the plaintif f." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Administrative Procedure Act makes reviewable any "final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate r emedy in a court," 5 U.S.C. 
S 704, so long as the statute under which the agency acted does not 
preclude judicial review or the agency action is not "committed to agency 
discretion by law." Id. S 701(a). 
 




Although summary judgment was properly enter ed 
against any claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the 
Court had the authority to consider the complaint under a 
number of alternative theories. In United States v. McGlory, 
202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), we held that a 
district court had equitable jurisdiction "to consider a claim 
that a person received inadequate notice of completed 
administrative forfeiture proceedings."4 At least one court 
has found that the Administrative Procedur e Act itself 
creates a right of review of federal agency actions 
presenting issues of adequate notice. Ar mendariz-Mata v. 
DEA, 82 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 
Indeed, "the federal courts have universally upheld 
jurisdiction to review whether an administrative forfeiture 
satisfied statutory and due process r equirements." United 
States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding 
jurisdiction in equitable principles); United States v. Minor, 
228 F.3d 352, 357 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding jurisdiction to 
consider the plaintiff 's "constitutionally-derived equitable 
challenge to the administrative forfeitur e of the currency 
under the provisions for general federal question 
jurisdiction"); United States v. Dusenbery , 201 F.3d 763, 
766 n.7 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Clagett, 3 
F.3d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Sarit v. Drug 
Enforcement Admin., 987 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(same). In other words, a claimant can "collaterally attack 
an inadequately noticed administrative forfeiture by suing 
for equitable relief, i.e., the r eturn of the seized property 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1331, via the waiver of sovereign 
immunity found in section 702 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act." David B. Smith, 1 Prosecution and Defense 
of Forfeiture Cases, S 6.02, at 6-29 (2000). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This is so even if the claim is styled as a Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(e) motion for the recovery of property and is brought after 
criminal proceedings are completed; courts are to treat such claims as 
civil suits seeking to set aside forfeitures. McGlory, 202 F.3d at 670;see 
United States v. Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); Thompson 
v. Covington, 47 F.3d 974, 975 (8th Cir . 1995) (same); United States v. 
Giovanelli, 998 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir . 1993) (same). 
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In light of this substantial authority, we conclude that 
the District Court was correct in considering the 
constitutional issue of adequate notification under theories 




At the time of plaintiff 's arrest, the procedure for 
initiating an administrative forfeitur e in a drug case was 
governed by 21 U.S.C. S 881 and 19 U.S.C. SS 1607-08. The 
government was required to send a letter notifying the 
property owner of the impending forfeitur e and to publish 
notice of the seizure for three successive weeks in a 
newspaper of national circulation. 19 U.S.C.S 1607(a). 
 
In giving effect to these statutory requirements, due 
process requires that notice to the property owner be 
"reasonably calculated, under all the cir cumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 
306, 314 (1950). In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 
462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983), the Court reiterated Mullane's 
due process standard, stating that "[n]otice by mail or other 
means as certain to insure actual notice is a minimum 
constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will 
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of [a] party 
. . . if its name and address are r easonably ascertainable." 
More specifically, the Court has cautioned that "[f]orfeitures 
are not favored; they should be enfor ced only when within 
both letter and spirit of the law." United States v. One 1936 
Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939). 
 
We have held that a notice of forfeitur e mailed to an 
owner's home when the government knew that the 
defendant was in jail did not satisfy constitutional due 
process requirements. United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. 
Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1995); see also 
Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972) (notice of 
state forfeiture proceedings was inadequate when mailed to 
claimant's home while claimant was imprisoned); Lopez v. 
United States, 201 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same 
conclusion, even though claimant's wife received notice); 
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Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1161 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (notice inadequate "wher e the . . . notice . . . is 
returned undelivered, the intended r ecipient is known by 
the notifying agency to be in government custody, and the 
agency fails to take steps to locate him"). 
 
Although this Court has never required"actual notice," 
we have held that mailing notice to the United States 
Marshals Service, in whose custody the claimant was held 
at the time of the mailing, was constitutionally inadequate. 
McGlory, 202 F.3d at 673-74.5 In United States v. One 
Toshiba Color Television, 213 F .3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(en banc), we held that the government had the burden of 
establishing that the procedures at the prison to which a 
forfeiture notice was sent were r easonably calculated to 
insure delivery of the notice to the intended r ecipient. See 
also Minor, 228 F.3d at 358 (adopting One Toshiba 
standard); Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1337-38 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (when government has information that a 
reasonable person would use to locate the claimant, it is 
obliged to resend notice if doing so would not be 
burdensome); Woodall, 12 F .3d at 794-95 (placing a greater 
burden on government in notifying an incarcerated 
claimant or one whom the government is pr osecuting). 
These cases illustrate that, particularly wher e the claimant 
is in a place chosen by the government, due pr ocess may 
require that the government make multiple attempts at 
notification if the claimant's name and addr ess are 
reasonably ascertainable. Accord United States v. Rodgers, 
108 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1997) (charging the DEA 
with information about the plaintiff 's address provided by 
local authorities' seizure records). 
 
In this case, the District Court relied on Madewell v. 
Downs, 68 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 1995). There, notice was 
sent to the claimant's last known address, the one he 
admitted giving to the authorities upon his arr est. The 
letter was returned marked "Moved. Left no address." Id. at 
1035. Although the claimant alleged that the DEA knew his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Other courts have taken a more relaxed view on the adequacy of 
notice. See Whiting v. United States, No. 99-1141, 2000 WL 1672813, at 
*6 n.6 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2000) (citing cases). 
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correct address, the Court refused to credit that assertion 
in the absence of evidence that the DEA had any contact 
with the claimant that would have alerted it to his change 
of address. Id. The Court concluded that the lack of notice 
was the result of the claimant's own conduct and, 
accordingly, granted summary judgment to the government. 
Id. at 1047. 
 
We question Madewell's holding on notice, particularly in 
the context of a motion for summary judgment, and note 
that it appears inconsistent with United States v. Cupples, 
112 F.3d 318 (8th Cir. 1997),6 decided later by the same 
Court. In any event, we find Madewell distinguishable. 
 
Here, the District Court stated that the gover nment 
directed its "notification to the addr ess that Plaintiff 
provided to police when he was arrested." Citing Madewell, 
the Court observed that when a person moves, it is his 
obligation to advise the Post Office of his change of address; 
and therefore, lack of notice resulting from his failure to do 
so could not be attributed to the government. Unlike 
Madewell, however, the parties to this case sharply contest 
the address Foehl gave to the Beaumont police at the time 
of his arrest. Madewell, therefor e, is not helpful in resolving 
the case before us at the summary judgment stage. 
 
When the notice sent to Thompson Court was r eturned to 
the DEA, the agency did nothing more than make a cursory 
check with its division office in Houston, T exas, which, 
according to the record, had no prior involvement with 
Foehl's case. Because his driver's license was issued in 
Alabama, one would have expected the DEA to check with 
its New Orleans Division, which includes the offices in 
Alabama. 
 
The report prepared by the police on the date of the 
arrest in Texas shows that the Mobile, Alabama Sheriff 's 
Office had informed the Beaumont authorities that Foehl 
was a known marijuana trafficker and was about to be 
indicted by federal authorities.7 Had the DEA contacted its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Cupples, the Court observed that in the circumstances there, 
whether the claimant received actual notice was a question of fact to be 
determined by the trial court. 112 F.3d at 320. 
7. Chickasaw and Eight Mile are located about eight miles apart on the 
northern outskirts of Mobile, Alabama. 
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Alabama branch, it almost certainly would have lear ned of 
Foehl's impending arrest and of the Lott Road address. 
 
It is a fair inference that the DEA, having adopted the 
currency from the Beaumont police, was aware that the 
Texas authorities were undertaking for feiture proceedings 
on the truck. In those circumstances, it is difficult to 
understand why the DEA did not confirm Foehl's address 
with the Beaumont police or the Jefferson County district 
attorney. A simple phone call to either would have revealed 
that notice of the truck's forfeiture had been mailed to 
Foehl and his wife at Lott Road. 
 
Moreover, although Foehl was not in jail at the time the 
notice was returned, he had been released on bail.8 We can 
safely assume that the Beaumont police had a very good 
idea of his whereabouts during that time. Accord Woodall, 
12 F.3d at 794 (holding that where defendant is released to 
an address known to the government, due process requires 
the government to notify defendant at that address). 
 
Finally, the record establishes that a duplicate license 
was issued to Foehl on March 3, 1993, listing Lott Road as 
his address. A call to the Alabama License Bur eau in March 
or April of 1993 would have revealed his then-current 
address. 
 
The record in this case, viewed in the light most favorable 
to Foehl as the nonmoving party, reveals that he lived at 
the Lott Road address at the time of the notice and 
forfeiture. After learning that Foehl did not receive the letter 
mailed to the Thompson Court address, the DEA, with the 
most minimal effort, could have obtained his correct 
address and notified him of the impending for feiture. 
 
We do not impose on a forfeiting agency the burden of 
checking all possible sources for a claimant's address. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The record does not reveal when the notice was returned to the DEA. 
In Small, 136 F.3d at 1337, the Court resolved this issue in the 
claimant's favor, stating "the United States failed to record the date on 
which it received the letter [notifying claimant of forfeiture] back; 
information on that issue is within the gover nment's exclusive control, 
and so the government . . . must bear the bur den of this gap in the 
record." 
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DEA was, however, obligated under Mullane  to provide 
notice reasonably calculated under all the cir cumstances to 
apprise him of the proceedings. The DEA had four obvious 
sources: the Beaumont Township Police Department, the 
Jefferson County district attorney, the DEA office for 
Alabama, and the Alabama Driver's License Bur eau. The 
DEA's failure to check with any of these sour ces was 
unreasonable under the circumstances, and its minimal 
effort to notify plaintiff of the for feiture cannot fairly be 
considered to be "within both letter and spirit of the law." 
One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. at 226. 
 
Nor do we require or even imply that notice by writing or 
other means be certain to insure actual notice as a 
minimum constitutional precondition. Our focus here is 
rather on the glaring lack of effort by the DEA to ascertain 
Foehl's correct address. The constitutional mandate of 
adequate notice cannot be treated as empty ritual. 
 
Because of disputed material facts and errors in the 
application of relevant legal authorities, the record in this 
case does not support the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the government, and we are, ther efore, compelled 




We need not reach the laches issue because the defense 
is not available where a judgment is void. In One Toshiba, 
we held that a judgment of forfeiture obtained without 
proper notice to a claimant is void, and that the passage of 
time could not transmute this nullity into a binding 
judgment. One Toshiba, 213 F.3d at 157-58. At least three 
Courts of Appeals have decided similarly. See Cly`more v. 
United States, 217 F.3d 370, 378 (5th Cir . 2000), aff 'd on 
panel reh'g, No. 99-50860, 2000 WL 1206012, at *1 (5th 
Cir. Aug. 24, 2000); Kadonsky v. United States, 216 F.3d 
499, 508 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 
1213, 1216-18 (9th Cir. 1999); Clymor e v. United States, 
164 F.3d 569, 572-74 (10th Cir. 1999). But see Dusenbery, 
201 F.3d at 768 (treating inadequate notice as voidable); 
Boero v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 301, 307 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (same). Because the recor d at this stage does not 
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One other matter requires resolution on remand. The 
government denies that Foehl was a resident of New Jersey 
at the time he filed his complaint, contending that he 
currently lives in Alabama. Indeed, the gover nment asserts 
that Foehl was an inmate in a federal prison in Arkansas 
when he began this suit and, accordingly, was not entitled 
to lay venue in New Jersey. 
 
The District Court noted that the government's objection 
attacking venue may have been untimely and ther efore 
waived. In view of its disposition of the case, however, the 
Court found it unnecessary to decide the issue. W e are 
inclined to agree that the challenge to venue may have been 
waived. Nevertheless, the District Court may wish to 
transfer the case to a more appropriate district in 
accordance with the flexibility provided by 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1404 and 1406. 
 
Because this suit was brought under the Administrative 
Procedure Act rather than as a motion under Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 41(e), we need not be concerned by 
the venue restrictions in that rule.9  Here, there were no 
federal criminal proceedings to which the for feiture was 
related, nor are any in progr ess. Moreover, currency is 
fungible and, unlike a res, which has some tangible 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that in cases brought under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(e), the question of the pr oper venue has caused a circuit 
split. Even though the courts treat the pr oceedings as civil suits, the 
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth Cir cuits have decided that 
when the criminal proceeding has been concluded, any suit to set aside 
the forfeiture must be filed in the district in which the property was 
seized. See Clymore, 164 F.3d at 574-75; Garcia, 65 F.3d at 20-21. The 
Second and Eighth Circuits, on the contrary, have held that the district 
court in which the criminal proceeding had taken place was the proper 
venue. See Thompson, 47 F.3d at 975; Giovanelli, 998 F.2d at 119. This 
circuit split would be resolved by the pr oposed change in Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 41(g) designating the district in which seizure 
occurred as the location where a motion must be filed. 
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connection with a definite location, presents no compelling 
venue problems. We therefor e consider this suit as 
governed by the broader venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1391 and 28 U.S.C. S 1406. 
 
It appears that resolution of the facts af fecting the issues 
in this case will require further pr oceedings. Even if Foehl 
did reside in New Jersey at the relevant time, the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses would ar guably be 
better served if the proceedings were conducted in the 
Eastern District of Texas or the Souther n District of 
Alabama. New Jersey does not appear to be a convenient 
location for any of the parties involved, and the District 
Court may wish to transfer this case to a mor e appropriate 
venue for disposition. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
I cannot join the majority's opinion. I believe it fails to 
recognize the express limitation in this court's prior cases 
that consider what is required to give notice of forfeiture. In 
the name of due process, the majority expands that 
requirement beyond the applicable pr ecedent and extends 
the government's duty beyond reasonable limits without 




The Supreme Court enunciated the overar ching principle 
of due process notice in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), stating that "[a]n 
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process 
. . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." That principle was applied in 
Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972), wher e the 
Supreme Court held that notice mailed to a prisoner's home 
address by the state in whose custody the prisoner was 
held failed to meet the standard set in Mullane. Thereafter, 
this court was presented with three cases relating to the 
adequacy of notice of different for feitures to the same 
prisoner, Reginald McGlory: United States v. $184,505.01 in 
U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995) (notice deficient 
when sent to last home address of claimant the government 
knew to be incarcerated); United States v. McGlory, 202 
F.3d 664 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (notice inadequate when 
sent to United States Marshal's Service located in 
courthouse where claimant was convicted rather than to 
prison where he was incarcerated); and United States v. 
One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F .3d 147 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(en banc) (notice inadequate when sent to prisoner's pre- 
incarceration address and his ex-wife's home). 
 
In all three McGlory cases, the dispositive fact with 
regard to the due process requir ement was that the person 
seeking to challenge the forfeiture was in prison at the time 
of the notice. As we stated in One Toshiba , "the 
circumstances of prisoners differ gr eatly from free citizens, 
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a fact that potentially alters the evaluation of what steps 
are reasonably calculated to provide notice. When an 
individual is incarcerated at a location of the government's 
choosing, the government's ability to find and directly serve 
him or her with papers is at or near its zenith. Not only 
does the government know where to find the person, it can 
be equally sure that he or she will be ther e when the 
papers are delivered. Indeed, it can even move the person 





The majority relies on these and other cases where the 
issue was the nature of the government's duty to give 
notice of forfeiture to a prisoner whose whereabouts the 
government must be presumed to know, unlike this case 
where the appellant was at large. The case at hand more 
closely resembles Madewell v. Downs, 68 F.3d 1030, 1046 
(8th Cir. 1995), than any case in the McGlory trilogy. In 
Madewell, the DEA mailed a notice by certified mail to the 
address the property owner gave when arr ested and took no 
further action directly to notify him, even after the letter 
was returned marked "Moved. Left no address." Before the 
notice was sent, Madewell had given his new addr ess to the 
prosecutor in the related state pr oceeding, but the DEA 
never called the prosecutor. The Eighth Circuit held that 
the DEA's notification efforts were constitutionally 
sufficient, noting that Madewell like Foehl was not in 
federal custody, not being prosecuted for a federal offense, 
and not on release to a new address by a federal court 
during the notice period. The court found the DEA had no 
obligation to inquire as to Madewell's addr ess because it 
had no notice the address had changed. See Madewell, 68 
F.3d at 1050. 
 
I do not disagree with the propositions the majority 
derives from the cases it cites, namely that: (1) the 
government does not satisfy due process when it sends a 
notice to an interested party's home addr ess knowing the 
party is in prison; and (2) the government has a heightened 
burden to ensure notice to an incar cerated interested party, 
particularly when it incarcerated the party. However, these 
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propositions are neither inconsistent with Madewell nor 
compel a finding that the notice in this case was 
inadequate. The majority fails to address the following 
obvious distinctions between the cases establishing these 
principles and this case: (1) the DEA did not know Foehl 
did not reside at the Thompson Court addr ess when it 
mailed the notice there; (2) Foehl was not incarcerated at 
the time the government sought to give notice of the 
forfeiture, nor was he subject to any version of federal 
custody during the notice period; and (3) Foehl violated 
Alabama law by failing to update the address on his driver's 
license. 
 
1. The DEA Did Not Know the Thompson Court Address 
       Was Incorrect 
 
Judging the DEA's initial notification effort at the time it 
was made, it was reasonably calculated to notify Foehl of 
the impending forfeiture. This good faith effort is completely 
distinguishable from the notification ef forts this court 
found deficient in the McGlory trilogy. In the McGlory 
cases, the government had reason to know when it sent the 
notices that McGlory did not reside at the addr esses to 
which it sent them. 
 
It is clear that when the government mails a notice to an 
address where it knows an interested party does not reside 
(for example, because it has incarcerated the party) it has 
not made reasonable efforts to notify the party. See 
$184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F .3d at 1163-64 (citing 
Robinson, 409 U.S. 38, and other cases). However , I am not 
persuaded by the majority's apparent equation of such a 
situation to one in which the government mails a notice to 
an address where it believes a claimant r esides, only to 
discover that the address is invalid when the notice is 
returned undelivered. In the first situation, the notice was 
constitutionally inadequate when sent. In the second, the 
notice, when sent, was reasonably calculated to reach the 
claimant. Cf. Madewell, 68 F.3d at 1046 ("Whether notice 
was adequate is measured at the time the notice was sent.") 
(quoting United States v. Woodall,12 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 
1993)). 
 
2. Foehl Was Not Incarcerated  
 
Because Foehl was not incarcerated during the notice 
period, he did not "lack[ ] the ability to take steps to ensure 
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that his mail [was] actually delivered to him," One Toshiba, 
213 F.3d at 154, one of the important bases on which we 
predicated that decision. As we explained,"[i]n the outside 
world, an individual who changes addresses can arrange to 
have mail forwarded and can notify inter ested parties as to 
the change of address." Id. This is particularly applicable to 
Foehl, who was well aware that the officers had found and 
seized $93,163 in cash along with marijuana hidden in 
spare tires in his wife's truck while he was driving it. 
 
Moreover, the fact that Foehl was r eleased by the 
Beaumont police on bail, mentioned by the majority, did 
not impact in any way his ability to take steps to ensure 
the delivery of his mail. Nor did this non-federal"custody" 
give the federal government any special information 
concerning Foehl's whereabouts. Ther efore, the DEA was 
not subject to the heightened notice requir ements 
applicable when the claimant is in (federal) custody. 
 
3. Foehl Did Not Comply with Alabama's Addr ess-Change 
       Requirements 
 
Alabama law obliged Foehl to correct his addr ess on his 
driver's license within thirty days of moving, which 
requirement is written on the back of Alabama driver's 
licenses. See Walton Decl., P 8, Supp. App. at 67; Exhibits 
F, G, Supp. App. at 79-80 (copies of the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety rules and regulations and the 
driver's license in effect in 1989). The Post Office, when 
asked, will forward an individual's mail fr om the old to the 
new address for longer than one month. See, e.g., United 
States Postal Service Web Page, http://www.usps.com/ 
moversnet/q_and_a.html (January 8, 2001). Foehl claims to 
have moved from Thompson Court to Lott Road one year 
before his arrest. During that period, he did not notify the 
Alabama authorities of his change of address in compliance 
with the law. Therefore, any confusion as to his proper 





The majority writes that "[a]fter lear ning that [Foehl] did 
not receive the letter mailed to the Thompson Court 
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address, the DEA, with the most minimal ef fort, could have 
obtained [his] correct address and notified him of the 
impending forfeiture." The majority pr offers "four obvious 
sources: the Beaumont Township Police Department, the 
Jefferson County district attorney, the DEA office for 
Alabama, and the Alabama Driver's License Bur eau." It 
concludes the "failure to check with any of these sources 
was unreasonable under the circumstances." 
 
Because this is not a case in which Foehl was in custody 
during the forfeiture notice period, ther e is no reason to 
place on the forfeiting agency the bur den of checking with 
all possible sources of Foehl's then curr ent address. The 
DEA's original notice, sent to Foehl's stated addr ess, 
satisfied due process. Nonetheless, I will consider briefly 
whether the DEA had any reason to look to the sources 
suggested by the majority. 
 
1. The Beaumont Township Police and the Alabama 
       Driver's License Bureau 
 
When Foehl was arrested and the money and drugs 
seized by the Beaumont police in Jefferson County, Texas, 
his driver's license listed his Thompson Court addr ess. This 
was the address the Beaumont police provided to the DEA 
and thus the address that the DEA used to send its notice 
of forfeiture. Even if, as the majority states, Foehl "sharply 
contest[s]" which address he gave to the Beaumont police at 
the time of his arrest, there is no dispute that the 
Beaumont authorities sent the Thompson Court addr ess to 
the DEA. 
 
Because the Beaumont police had provided thefirst 
invalid address taken from Foehl's driver's license, the DEA 
had no particular reason to believe that either the 
Beaumont police or the Alabama Driver's License Bur eau 
had a better one. The agency could reasonably assume 
that: (1) Foehl maintained an up-to-date addr ess on his 
driver's license pursuant to Alabama law; (2) Foehl would 
otherwise have made a point to notify the police of his 
actual address; and (3) the Beaumont police would have 
included a second address had Foehl provided one. The fact 
that we now know in hindsight that one or mor e of these 
assumptions would have been incorrect does not make 
them unreasonable. 
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2. The Jefferson County District Attor ney 
 
Because the Jefferson County district attor ney, like the 
DEA, presumably received his infor mation on Foehl from 
the Beaumont police, it is unclear why the DEA would have 
expected the district attorney to have a mor e accurate 
address for Foehl than did the Beaumont police. Moreover, 
it is unclear what the district attorney, if contacted, would 
have told the DEA. The district attorney did have Foehl's 
Lott Road address as early as March 12, 1993, when he 
sent a Complaint of forfeiture of the truck to Lott Road. 
However, the receipt of service of the Complaint was not 
signed by Foehl or by his wife, but by "Car ol Barnhill," 
apparently no relation. Therefor e, by the time the DEA's 
March 29 notice of forfeiture was r eturned, the Jefferson 
County district attorney already knew Lott Road to be, at 
best, an uncertain address for Foehl. 
 
3. The DEA Office for Alabama 
 
The majority questions the DEA's judgment in dir ecting 
its inquiry regarding Foehl to DEA-Houston rather than to 
the DEA division covering Alabama, given that Foehl was 
from Alabama and that DEA-Houston "had no prior 
involvement with [Foehl's] case." However , there was no 
reason for the DEA forfeiture division to contact the 
Alabama division, which was not involved with the 
forfeiture at issue. In fact, DEA-Houston was the 
originating division for the forfeitur e, according to both 
parties' briefs. Foehl himself appears to concede that DEA- 
Houston was the appropriate division.1 Therefore, the DEA's 
inquiry to its Houston division after its first notice to Foehl 
was returned constituted precisely the type of reasonable 
inquiry the majority suggests the DEA should have made.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Foehl argues that the DEA's inquiry was ineffective, not because 
Houston was the wrong division but because the DEA misidentified him 
by inquiring about "Don Foehl" or "Don Ameche Foehl," rather than "Don 
Ameche Foehl, Sr." 
 
2. One additional point the majority does not address is whether the 
DEA would have met with success had it made one of the suggested 
inquiries, obtained Foehl's Lott Road address, and sent a notice there. In 
fact, there is no evidence that Foehl r eceived the forfeiture notice for 
his 
wife's truck, which the Jefferson County District Attorney sent to the 
Lott Road address. 
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This hardly constitutes a "glaring lack of effort," as the 




In conclusion, the relevant precedent r equires the 
government to take reasonable measur es to notify an 
interested party of impending forfeitur e proceedings. The 
DEA's initial notice alone, and certainly when combined 
with its follow-up inquiry to its Houston division, satisfies 
this requirement. No case obliges the government to go to 
extraordinary lengths in its notification ef forts, yet that is 
precisely what the majority holds is required. This conflicts 
with our repeated statements that the gover nment duly is 
to provide notice to an individual "whose name and address 
are known or reasonably ascertainable." McGlory, 202 F.3d 
at 672 (quotation omitted). The majority has thus raised the 
level of due process beyond that ever suggested by the 
Supreme Court or this court, and has not pr ovided any 
standard that the forfeiting agency should follow in the next 
case. It is not enough for a court to say mer ely, "do better," 
yet that is what the majority has done. 
 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
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